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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***QW
Date: 4/26/2021 9:15 AM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

BERNARD H. BRONNER,

derivatively on behalf of Rainforest
Production Holdings, Inc. and
directly on behalf of himself,
Plaintiff,

V.
ROBERTE. HARDY, IL,
WILLIAM E. PACKER, JR. and
TRF PRODUCTIONS, LLC,
Individual Defendants,
and

RAINFOREST PRODUCTION
HOLDINGS, INC.
Nominal Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
) Civil Action File No.
) 2014CV248023
)
)

)
)
)

Bus. Case Div. 3

)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The abovestyled action is before this Court on: (1) Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment,filed January 14, 2021 and (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summa
ry
Judgment — Breach of Contract,filed January 15, 2021. Having reviewed the
record
and considered the argumentof counsel during an April 7, 2021 hearing, the Court
enters the following order.

1. SUMMARYOFFACTS

1.1 Primary Shareholders ofRainforest Resolve Disputes with
Reconciliation Agreement
Defendant Rainforest Production Holdings, Inc. (“Rainforest”) was registered
as a Georgia corporation in 1996 by founders DefendantRobert E. Hardy
(“Hardy”)
and Defendant William E. Packer (Packer) to participate in the film produc
tion
business.

(Compl., { 24; Answer, ¥ 24.)

In 1998, Hardy and Packer formed

Defendant TRF Productions, LLC (“TRF ”) as a subsidiary of Rainforest
in order to
develop, produce, anddistribute a film titled Trois. (Defs. SMF, § 9;
Pl. Resp. to
Dets. SMF, ¥ 9.)'

After production ofthe film, Hardy and Packer were unableto

secure funding from a movie studioto distribute Trois. (Defs. SMF, { 18; Pl.
Resp.
to Defs. SMF, ¥ 18.) Following a screening ofthe film at the Acapulco Black
Film
Festival in the summer of 1999, Hardy and Packer were introduced to Plainti
ff
Bernard H. Bronner (“Bronner”), who expressed interest in investing in
Trois.
(Defs. SMF, {fj 18-19, 21; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, 4] 18-19, 21.) Bronner
entered
into a number of subscription agreements with TRF (collectively “Subsc
ription
Agreement”). (Compl., § 85; Answer and Countercl., | 85.) Bronner subseq
uently
invested and/or helped to secure investments of over $500,000.00 in
Trois and

' This citation as used here and throughoutthis order refers to Defendan
ts’ Statement of Material Facts and Theories
of Non-Recovery,filed January 14, 2021, in support ofits current motionfo
rpartial summary judgment and Plaintiff's
responsethereto, filed February 17, 2021. Occasionally, throughoutthe
order, the Court willrefer to prior statements
filedin relation to earlier motions for summary judgment. When makingsu
chcitation, the Court will so note with the
filing date.

Rainforest and ultimately became a shareholder, director and
Vice President of
Marketing for Rainforest. (Defs. SMF, {1 22, 27; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF,
ff 22, 27.)
After Trois, Rainforest was involved in the production
of various films,

including: Trois 2: Pandora’s Box, The Gospel, and Stomp the Yard.
(Defs. SMF,
1147, 49, 55; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, 99 47, 49, 55.) However,disagre
ements arose
regarding the management, day-to-day operationsandfinancesof Rainfo
rest.? The
parties ultimately sought to resolve their differences via a
Shareholder’s
Reconciliation Agreement, dated October8, 2010, and signed
by Rainforest, its
wholly

owned-subsidiary Rainforest

Films,

Hardy,

Packer,

and

Bronner

(“Reconciliation Agreement”)? (Defs. SUMF, {| 84; Pls, Resp. to
Defs. SUMF, J
84.)

The Reconciliation Agreement expressly stated Hardy and Packe
r were

“primarily responsible for and actively involved in the management
and oversight
of the day-to-day operations and affairs of [Rainforest] and
its affiliates...”
(Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals, { 4.)

Hardy and Packer executed the

Reconciliation Agreement as “Founders” and collectively assum
ed certain
responsibilities and received certain benefits in that capacity. (See e.g.,
Id., §§ 1.5,
2.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1.)
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See e.g, Defs. SMF, 1] 37, 40-42, 62, 64-68, 73, 75, 79-83; Pl. Respon
se to Defs. SMF, §{] 37, 40-42, 62,
64-68, 73, 75, 79-83.
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An authenticated copy of the Reconciliation Agreementis attache
d to the Consolidated Pre-Trial Order. (Id.

4, 10, Ex. A.)

As an initial matter, the Reconciliation Agreement required Rainfo
rest to
prepare an accounting ofthe revenuesreceived from Trois and deliver
it to Bronner
(“Trois Financial Report”). (Id., § 1.6.)
The Reconciliation Agreementalso addressed the structure of the Rainfo
rest
business going forward.

It broadly described the purpose of the business as

performing “featurefilm, television, and other motion business activit
ies (the “Core
Business”) that involve the direct orindirect provision of services by
the Founders”
or other Rainforest-related personnel (emphasis in original). (Id.,
Recitals, $3.) It
indicated the Founders were “primarily responsible” for overseeing “all
projects that
are part of its Core Business(suchprojects, collectively, “Core Busin
ess Projects”)
undertaken by Rainforest . . . (emphasis in original). (Id., J 4.)
Article II of the Reconciliation Agreementaddresses compensation issues
and
outlines the company’s finances. Section 2.1 provides,
[Rainforest] shall continue to use Rainforest Films or another operating
entity of or controlled by [Rainforest] to engage in all Core Business
Projects in which either of the Founders receives any compensation or
other paymentfor his servicesasa result of such Core Business Project.
No compensation or other payment may be madeto either of the
Founders on account of any service performed by a Founder with
respect to any Core Business Project, except as provided in
this
Agreementor unless such compensation or other payment is approved
by the Board of Directors . .
Section 2.2 established a base annual salary of $175,000 for Hardy
and Packer for
their work on “Core Business activities.” Sections 2.3 and
2.4 outlined how

compensation Hardy and Packerreceived from third parties for
their work on Core
Business Projects would be shared with Rainforest. Section 2.3
concernedprojects
where Hardy or Packer worked individually.

Generally, the provision allowed

Hardy or Packer to keep 50% of any “front-end” payment with
the other 50% being
allocated to Rainforest. With regard to “back-end” compensati
on payments, 10%
would be paid to the Hardy or Packer, depending on who perfo
rmed the work, and
90% would be allocated to Rainforest. (Id.) Section 2.4 conce
rned projects where
the two worked together. Section 2.5 requires Rainforest to calcu
late and establish
a year-end bonus pool (“Year-End Bonus Pool”) following set
parameters and then
divide the pool equally among Hardy, Packer and Bronner.
Additionally, the Reconciliation Agreement contained release
provisions, a
mutual non-disparagementclause as well as a clause governing modif
ications. (Id.,
§§ 1.3-1.5, 3.1, 5.4.) Pursuant to the modification clause, the
agreement could only
be modified or amendedby a written instrument approved by the
Board of Directors
of Rainforest and signed by or on behalf of Rainforest, Rainf
orest Films and
Shareholders owning not less than 75% of the Shares. (Id.,
§ 5.4.)

When the

Reconciliation Agreement was executed, Hardy owned 32.1%
, Packer owned 31.5%

and Bronner owned 30.8% of Rainforest shares.
Recitals, § 1.)

(Reconciliation Agreement,

Contemporaneously with the Reconciliation Agreement, the parties execut
ed
a Shareholders Agreement which expressly acknowledged and “operated
together”
with the Reconciliation Agreement to govern ownership and management
of
Rainforest moving forward. (Defs. Feb. 21,2018 SMF, § 92, Ex. J;
Pl. June 21, 2018

Resp. to Defs. SMF, § 92.)
1.2 Disputes Among Primary Shareholders Continue after Reconciliati
on
Agreement and Rainforest Formally Dissolves.
As detailed below, the record indicates that the compensation struct
ure was
abandoned in early 2012, andit reflects contradictory versionsof events leadin
g to
the change.
Following the Stompthe Yard films in 2010, Hardy and Packeraver
they did
not work together on any project. (Hardy Depo., p. 297, 300; Hardy Aff.,
§ 39;
Packer Aff., 738.) They claimed their efforts to pitch Rainforest projects and
expand
its business were unsuccessful.5 Hardy and Packer claim they separately
began
pursuing individualprojects, “trying to “capitalize on [their] individual succes
ses.”
Section 1.5 of the Shareholders Agreement expressly provides:
Acknowledgment of Reconciliation Agreement. The provisions of this
Agreementand the
provisions of the Reconciliation Agreementare intended to be consistent
and to operate
together to establish the parameters and protocols for certain aspects
ofthe relationship
among the Founders and Bronner with respect to the operations
and affairs of the
Corporation andits operating entities, including Rainforest Films. The
parties expressly
agree that the provisions of this Agreement and those of the Reconcil
iation Agreement
shall be construed and enforced in accordance with suchintent.
5
For example, Defendants contend, in an effort to raise Rainforest’s profile
and potentially generate future
development opportunities, Packer gave “Executive Producer (vanity) credit
to [Rainforest]” for some of his solo
movie projects including Think Like a Man2, Ride Along,and About Last
Night whereas Bronner suggests Hardy and
Packer did not pursue these efforts to boost the Rainforest profile in good
faith and were diverting opportunities and
revenues that belonged to Rainforest. (Defs. SMF, {| 102-114; Pl. Resp. to Defs.
SMF, § 102-114.)
6

(Hardy Dep., p. 297; Packer Dep., May5, 2018, pp. 248-249.)
They argue these
individual projects were not subject to the Reconciliation Agree
ment. (Hardy Aff.,
4] 30; Packer Aff., 29). Bronnerclaims these “loan outs” of Hardy
and Packer were
part of the Rainforest business model, dating from before the Stomp
the Yard films.
(Packer Dep., Jan. 31, 2018, pp. 166, 169, 172-173; Hardy Dep.,
pp. 277-279: Pl.’s
Appx. of Evid. Mat., filed June 18, 2018, Ex. M.)®
Hardy and Packer claim once they began pursuing their separ
ate individual
projects, they used someof the money they earned to makecapita
l contributions to
Rainforest, attempting to keep the companyafloat. (Hardy Aff.,
§ 30; Packer Aff,
{ 29).

However, the allocation of the payments they made to Rainforest
appear

consistent with the Reconciliation Agreement with one-half
of the front-end
compensation for these individual projects being allocated to Rainfo
rest.

(Hardy

Dep., p. 301; Reconciliation Agreement, § 2.3.)
In early 2012, the compensation structure of Rainforest was affirm
atively
changed. Hardy and Packer decided to stop taking their Rainf
orest base annual
salaries, and they or their individual companies began to keep
all compensation
(front-end and back-end), they received for work on individual
projects. (Hardy
Dep., p. 286-288.) Hardy testified Rainforest was struggling financ
ially and the
change was motivated by a desire to help keep the companyafloat
by eliminating
° Exhibit M to Pl.’s Appx.of Evid. Mat., filed June 25, 2018 is
an April 20, 2014 letter Hardy wrote to Rainforest
shareholdersas identified in his deposition as Exhibit 3. (Hardy Dep.,
pp. 274-275).
7

the overheadcosts of their salaries, but he could not explain
the reasoning behind
eliminating a key source ofthe company’s revenue at a time
it was experiencing
financial distress.

(Id., pp. 290-292, 298.) Hardy could not recall on what authority

the compensation structure was changed. (Id., p. 293.)
Packer offered vague and inconsistent testimony about how
the decision to
change the compensation structure occurred. Hefirst testified
that he, Hardy and
Bronner together made the determination to change the
arrangement after a
discussion involvingall three. (Packer Dep., May 5, 2018, p. 242.)
Helatertestified
he was uncertain about Bronner’s thoughts regarding the altera
tion, but Packer did
not recall Bronnerraising a “strenuous objection” to the chang
e. (Id., pp. 245-246).
When questioned about whether Bronner wasinformed about the
change beforeit
occurred, Packer responded, “[a]t some point [Bronner] would
have been informed.
.. 1 don’t remember when he wasinformed.” (Id. pp. 246-247.)
The record doesnot contain any evidencethat the modification
provisions of
the Reconciliation Agreement -- requiring the change be madei
n writing with 75%
shareholder approval -- were followed in making this altera
tion to Article II.
(Reconciliation Agreement, § 5.4.)
Theparties continued to disagree on other topics such as the
revenues for
Trois and the use of company-owned resources including a wirel
ess service account
opened in the name of Rainforest, a Los Angeles, California
apartment owned and

paid for by Rainforest, and a company vehicle.’

Further, Bronner asserts Packer

used $400,000.00 of Rainforest’s credit for his personal use
without notice to or
authorization from shareholders. (PI’s Responseto Defs’ SMF,filed
June 12, 2018,

q 117.)
Hardy and Packer sought to dissolve Rainforest, and the disso
lution of
Rainforest was considered during a June 2, 2014 special meeti
ng of shareholders.
(Defs. SMF, J 124; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, J 124.) Priorto
that meeting, Bronner
served the Rainforest Board of Directors, Packer, and Hard
y with a “Shareholder

Demand Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742” wherein Bronner unsuc
cessfully lodged
various demands, including that Rainforest: withdraw the Notice
of Special Meeting,
investigate whether Packer and Hardy had harmed the company
by failing to meet
their fiduciary duties, engage an appraiser to evaluate the value
of the business, and
producevarious businessrecords. (Defs. SMF,filed Feb. 21,
2018, | 151, Ex. P; Pl.

Resp. to Defs. SMF, filed June 21, 2018, 4 151.) During the June
2, 2014 meeting,
the requisite number of Rainforest shares voted in favor of the propo
sed dissolution
of Rainforest, and the dissolution was later formalized, (Defs.
SMF, J] 124 -125,

Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, §f] 124-125.)
2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2.1 Shortly after Rainforest is Dissolved, Bronner Commences this
Lawsuit.
a

See Defs. SMF, {| 79-83, 96-108; Pl’s Response to Defs’ SMF,[|
79-83, 96-108.
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On June 20, 2014, shortly following Rainforest’s dissolution, Bronn
er filed

this lawsuit, asserting multiple causes of action against Hardy, Packer,
and TRF,
lodging some claimsdirectly on his own behalf and others derivatively on
behalf of
Rainforest. One of Plaintiff’s direct claims was a breach of contract claim
against
TRF, concerning the Subscription Agreement. (Compl.,

84-87.) Plaintiff's

complaint made no mention of the Reconciliation Agreement. Plainti
ff took the
position that it was unenforceable. Rainforest Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Bronne
r, Nos.

AI9A1684, A19A2157 (Ga. App., Mar. 4, 2020), p. 16. Plaintiff also filed a direct
claim against Hardy and Packer for fraud. (Compl., {J 89-90.) Defend
ants filed
various counterclaims that included a count for breach of the Reconc
iliation
Agreement’s non-disparagementclause. (Countercl., {| 57-64; Ver. Counte
rcl., 4
64-71.)

Specifically, Defendants claimed Bronnerfed information meant to
cast

Packerin an unfavorable light to a “tabloid-esque” blog focused on the

entertainment

industry. (Defs. SMF,Feb. 21, 2018, 44 126-128.)
2.2 Preliminary Motions, Cross Motions jor Summary Judgment
and
Appellate Opinion Narrow Claims ofAll Parties.
Plaintiff's cause of action for oppression was dismissed by this Court
in a
ruling on a preliminary motion. (Ord. on Defs. Mot. to Dismiss and for
J. on the
Pldgs., pp. 3-4.) Discovery continued for more than two years before
the parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment. On January 14, 2019 the Court
entered
a 55-page Order on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment, both granti
ng and
10

denying summary judgmenton various claims. That order was the subjec
t of cross
appeals, and on March 25, 2020, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued
a 45-page
unpublisheddecision that affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’
s order.
Rainforest Prod.
With regard to the prior motions for summary judgment and the subseq
uent
appellate opinion, the Court finds certain issues are especially pertinent to
this new
round of motions for summary judgment.
First, with regard to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, this Court
found the

statute of limitation and the release language of the Reconciliation Agree
ment,
which the Court found enforceable, barred any contract claim priorto its
execution
on October 8, 2010 including the breachof the Subscription Agreement allege
d by
Plaintiff. (Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 10-20.) However,de
spite this
finding, the trial court denied summary judgment, determining that a
jury question
remained as to whether Defendants breached the Reconciliation Agree
ment. (Id.,

pp. 19-22.)

The Court of Appeals noted that Plaintiff had steadfastly maintained

throughoutthat thelitigation that the Reconciliation Agreement was unenforceabl
e
as a matter of law.

Rainforest Prod., p. 16.

It found, “the trial court erred in

transforming Plaintiff's breach of contract claim — expressly raised in the
complaint
against TRF for violations of the Subscription Agreement — to include claim
sagainst
Hardy and Packer for violations of the Reconciliation Agreement.” Id., pp.
17-18.

Accordingly, this Court’s decision to deny summary judgmenton Plaint
iff's claim
for breach of contract regarding the Subscription Agreement wasreverse
d. Id., Dp.

18,
Second, in ruling on the summary judgment motions, this Court deter
mined
there were “factual disputes in the record regarding whether Defendants
adhered to
the compensation structure . . . under the Reconciliation Agreement”
noting “the
vague circumstances under whichthat structure was abandoned” were
never fully
explained. (Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J ., p. 30.) The Court
of Appeals
adopted this finding.
In denying summary judgment, the trial court noted that there wasat
least some evidencein the record to support Plaintiffs allegation that
Hardy and Packer unilaterally decided to change the compensati
on
structure established in the Reconciliation Agreement, and forgo their
salaries from Rainforest in favor of pursuing independentprojects.
Rainforest Prod., p. 24. Later in the opinion, the Court Appeals stated, “[w]e
agree
with thetrial court that there are disputedissues of materialfact concerning
Hardy’s
and Packer’s compensation.” Id., p. 27.
Third, this Court granted summary judgment on Bronner’s direct
claim
against Hardy and Packer for fraud as Bronnerfailed to establish he was
“uniquely
injured” because their alleged misrepresentations impacting Rainforest’s
finances
“would result in harm to the corporation andits shareholders alike, not just

Bronner.”

(Order on Pending Mot. for Summ., J., pp. 23-25 .) The Court of Appeals
concurred

with the Court’s reasoning thatthe fraud claim should be pursu
ed derivatively, not
directly, and affirmed the summary judgment. Rainforest Prod.
, pp. 33-35.
On May 1, 2020, this Court entered a judgment order on
the remittitur,

formally adopting the appellate decision. Accordingly,at that time,
the only claims
remaining in the case were Bronner’s derivative claims for breac
h of fiduciary duty,
corporate waste and misappropriation of corporate assets (as they
had been limited
by the summary judgment order and appellate opinion),® Defendants
’ counterclaim
for Bronner’s breach of the Reconciliation Agreement’s non-d
isparagementclause
as well as each side’s claims for attorney’s fees.
2.3 Post-Appeal Proceedings
On October 21, 2020, before the entry of a Pre-Trial Order
, Plaintiff filed a

Second Amended Shareholder Direct and Derivative Complaint (“Sec
ond Amended
Complaint”).° It restatesall the direct and derivative claims foundi
n the Plaintiff's
original complaint, as if no dismissal order, summary judgmentor
deror appellate
decision had ever been issued. The Second Amended Complaintd
id raise one new
claim, a direct claim against Hardy and Packer for breaching
the Reconciliation
Agreement. (Second Am. Compl., ff 93-97.) Defendants sough
t the Opportunity to
pursue a dispositive motion on Plaintiff's new breach of contra
ct claim and

8

?

Rainforest Prod., pp. 25-28.

Earlier that same day,Plaintiff filed his First Amended Shareholder
Direct and Derivative Complaint.
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expressed consternation about the re-asserted claims. (Defs. Resp.
to Mot. for Leave
to Amend,pp. 4-5, 13.)
A Consolidated Pre-Trial Order was entered on November
18, 2020. The

issues in disputeas identified by the Plaintiff did not include any
of the claims wher

e

judgment had beenpreviously granted. (Cons. Pre-Trial Ord.,
8.) That same day,
the Court entered an Amended Pre-Trial Scheduling Order
expressly stating,
“[d]ispositive motions, including motions for summary judgment,
shall be restricted
to new issues raised in Plaintiff's amended pleadings.” (Am. Pre-T
rial Sched. Order,
p. 2.) On January 14, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment
wherein Defendants: (1) requested the Court provide someclarif
ication regarding
the status of claims Plaintiff re-asserted in his Second Amended
Complaint and (2)
sought summary judgmenton Plaintiffs new claim. The follo
wing day Plaintiff
filed his cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Breach
of Contract, seeking
summary judgmentin favorofits newly asserted claim.
3. DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION ON
PLAINTIFF’S RE-ASSERTED CLAIMS.
As a “house-keeping” matter, Defendants seek an order of
clarification
regarding the causes of action that Plaintiff re-asserted in his
Second Amended
Complaint that were previously adjudicated.

(Defs. Memoin Supp. of Summ.J.,

pp. 5-6.) Specifically, Defendants request the Court “to adopt
the Georgia Court of
Appeals ruling concerningthe prior summary judgment.” (Id., p.
5.)
14

The Court has confirmedthatall of the re-asserted claims are identi
cal to those

found in Plaintiffs original complaint including: (1) oppression,!°
(2) breach of
contract regarding the Subscription Agreement,'! (3) fraud,!? (4) breach of
fiduciary

duty,'? (5) lack of candor,'* (6) gross mismanagement,'° (7) unjust
enrichment, (8)

ie
The allegations supporting the oppression claim are identica
l to those found in the original complaint.
(Compl., {{] 81-83; Second Am. Compl., 4 83-85.) The original claim
of oppression was dismissed by this Court in
a preliminary motion. (Order on Defs. Mot. to Dismiss and forJ.
on the Plgs., pp. 3-4.) That dismissal was not
appealed. Rainforest Prod., n. 2.
n
Theallegations supporting this breach of contract claim are identica
l to those foundin the original complaint.
(Compl., {{{] 85-87; Second Am. Compl., {11 87-89.) As discussed
in §2.2, supra, the Court of Appeals reversed this
Court’s decision to deny summary judgmentonthis claim. Rainfore
st Prod., pp. 13-18.
12
Theallegations supporting the fraud claim are identical to those
found in the original complaint. (Compl.,
{1 89-90; Second Am. Compl., {ff 91-92.) This Court’s grant
of summary judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Rainforest Prod., pp. 33-35.
b
The allegations supporting this breach of fiduciary duty claim are
identical to those found in the original
complaint. (Compl., 4 92-95; Second Am. Compl.,99-102.)
The Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants’ original motion for summary judgmentonthis claim.
(Order on Pending Mots. for Summ.J., pp. 31-37.)
The parties filed cross appeals regarding thetrial court’s decision
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Rainforest Prod., pp. 22-25, 35-37, 39-41.)
i
Theallegations of the lack of candorclaim areidentical to those
foundin the original complaint. (Compl.,
4197-98; Second Am. Compl., 99] 104-105.) This Court granted summar
y judgmentonthis claim. (Order on Pending
Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 37-39.) Plaintiff did not appealthis judgmen
t. Rainforest Prod., p:.3:
19
The allegations supporting the gross mismanagement claim are
identical to those found in the original
complaint. (Compl., {{{ 100-102; Second Am. Compl., {] 107-109.
) This Court granted summary judgmentonthis
claim. (Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 37-39.) Plaintif
f did not appealthis judgment. Rainforest Prod.,
p. 3.
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Theallegations supporting the unjust enrichmentclaim areidentical
to those foundin the original complaint.
(Compl., fj 107-108; Second Am. Compl.,114-115.) This Court
granted summary judgmenton this claim. (Order
on Pending Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 41-42.) Plaintiff did not appealth
is judgment. Rainforest Prod., p. 3.
wn

l

waste of corporate assets,'’ (9) abuse of control,!* (10) quantum meruit,'?
(11)
receivership,” and (12) misappropriation of corporate assets.2!
Rather, than have the Court adopt the prior ruling of the Court of Appeal
s,
Plaintiff contends,

the prudent and propercourseis to allow the prior rulings in this case
to be governed by thoughtfully-considered and well-established
proceduresalready in effect, including collateral estoppel, res judicata,
the remaining protections under the law of the case doctrine, and
protections under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h) (‘any ruling by the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all
subsequent proceedingsin that case in the lower court . . i)
(Pl. Resp. to Defs. Mot. for Summ. J., p. 6.)
Without offering any explanation asto why he choseto re-assert numer
ous
identical claims where an adverse judgmenthas already beenentered,
Plaintiff has
failed to recognizehis role in creating confusion. However, in making their
request

for relief, Defendants do not seem to recognizethat this Court has previo
usly entered

if
The allegations supporting the claims for waste of corporate assets
and misappropriation of corporate assets
are identical to those foundin the original complaint. (Compl., {{] 104-105,
120-121; Second Am. Compl., §J 111112; 127-128.) Onsummary judgment, the Court considered the misappro
priation claimcollectively with the waste
of corporate assets claim. This Court granted in part and denied in part
summary judgment on these twoclaims.
(Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 28-31 .) The Court’s decision
was affirmed on appeal. Rainforest Prod.,
pp. 25-28.
iS
Theallegations supporting the abuse of control claim are identical to those
foundin the original complaint.
(Compl., {f 110-112; Second Am. Compl., 49 117-119.) This Court granted
summary judgment onthis claim,
(Order on Pending Mots. for Summ.J., pp. 39-40.) Plaintiff did not appealth
is judgment. Rainforest Prod., p. 3.
B
Theallegations supporting the quantum meruit claim are identical to those
found in the original complaint.
(Compl., {ff 114-115; Second Am. Compl., 4] 121-122.) This Court granted
summary judgment onthis claim.
(Order on Pending Mots. for Summ.J., pp. 42-44.) Plaintiff did not appealth
is ruling. Rainforest Prod., pp. 2-3.
20
Theallegations supporting the requestfor a receiverare identical to those
foundin the original complaint.
(Compl., {ff 117-118; Second Am. Compl., 4] 124-125.) This Court granted
summary judgment onthis claim.
(Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 44-46.) Plaintiff did not appealth
is tuling. Rainforest Prod., pp. 2-3.

aL

See n. 17, supra.
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an order on the remittitur and the Consolidated Pre-Trial Order where
the disputed
issues identified by the Plaintiff were consistent with the prior
rulings of this Court
and the appellate court. (Cons. Pre-Trial Order, § 8.)
The Court will not step into the morass created by these re-ass
erted claims.
Specifically, the Court notes its November 18, 2020 AmendedPre-Tria
l Scheduling
Order, clearly indicates the Court would only consider dispositive
motions on “new
issues” raised in Plaintiff's amended complaint. As the Court detail
ed above, the
only new issueraised by Plaintiff in this amended pleading is his
direct claim that
Defendants Hardy and Packer breached the Reconciliation Agreement.
Because the requestedrelief seekingclarificationis in violation of
the Court’s
Amended Pre-Trial Scheduling Order, the Court rejects Defendants
’ request for an
orderofclarification.

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 2020 WL 5883344,at *3
(Ga. October 5,

2020), the Georgia Supreme Court recently reiterated the “well
-established
principles” guiding a trial court’s review of a motion for summary
judgment. “A
trial court can grant summary judgmentto a moving party only
if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the undisputed evidence warra
nts judgmentas a
matter of law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). In reviewing the evide
nce, a court must
construe all facts and draw all inferences in favor of the non-m
ovant.” Ward-Poag

expressly relied on Messex v. Lynch, 255 Ga. 208, 210 (1985) that
further provides,
“[t]he party opposing the motionis to be given the benefit of
all reasonable doubts
in determining whether a genuineissue exists, andthetrial court
mustgivethat party
the benefitofall favorable inferencesthat maybe drawn from
the evidence.”
Further, when cross-motions for summary judgmentare filed,
“each party
must showthatthere is no genuine issue of material fact regar
ding the resolution of
the essential points of inquiry andthat each, respectively, is
entitled to summary
judgment; either party, to prevail by summary judgment, mustb
earits burden of
proof.” Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 335
Ga. App. 302 (2015)
(citation and punctuation omitted),

5. ANALYSIS
9.1 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
5.1.1 The Claim for Breachofthe Reconciliation Agreementi
s not Timebarred.

Defendants argue the recent claim for breach of the Reconciliation
Agreement
is time-barred. (Defs. Memo. in Supp. of Summ. J., pp. 6-9.)
Plaintiff does not
dispute the statute of limitation would precludethis claim asit was
filed on October
21, 2020 but argues the claim “relates back” to the original
action, filed June 20,
2014, thus rendering it timely.

(PI. Resp. to Defs. Mot. for Summ.J., p. 6.) See

LAZ Parking/Georgia,Inc. v. Jones, 294 Ga. App. 122, 123 (2008
) (when a claim is

asserted after the statute of limitation has expired, the amendmen
tis only timely if
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it “relates back” to the original complaint.)

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) outlines

Georgia’s relation-back doctrine. In pertinent part, it provi
des, “[w]heneverthe
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arise
s out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original
pleading, the amendmentrelates backto the date of the origi
nal pleading.”
Tenet_Healthsystem GB, Inc. v. Thomas, 304 Ga. 86
(2018), recently
addressed Georgia’s relation back doctrine.

After considering its aims and

relationship to other portions of the statute that liber
ally permit pleading
amendments, the Georgia Supreme Court offered this guida
nce as to how O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-15(c) should be interpreted.
The best formulation for describing the parameters ofthe relat
ion back
doctrine and focusingon its underlying policies is the stand
ard found
in the ruleitself, i.e., whether the amended pleading alleges
matter that

arises out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence
asthat set

forth in the original pleading.

Id. at 630-631 (citations and punctuation omitted). In maki
ng this pronouncement,
Tenet_Healthsystem relied upon Jensen v. Engler, 317 Ga.
App. 879 (2012).
According to Jensen, the question of whether a claim adde
d by amendmentrelates
back “turns on fair notice of the same generalfact situation
from which the claim
arises” and an amendment should liberally be consideredto
relate back “unless the
causes of action are notonly different but arise out ofwholly differ
entfacts.” Id. at
883 (emphasisin original).
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In his amendedpleading,Plaintiff alleges Hardyand Packerfaile
d to comply
with numerous obligations under the Reconciliation Agreement
— including the
preparation of a report detailing revenuesattributable to Trois,
payment of agreed
upon compensation owed to Hardy and Packer in the form of
salary, payment of
compensation owed to Rainforest for certain Core Business
Projects, and the
establishment Year-End Bonus Pools.

(Second Am. Compl., §§ 95-96;

Reconciliation Agreement, §§ 1.6, 2.2-2.5.) The original compl
aint contained many
similar factual allegations.

It alleged Hardy and Packer hid key financial

information from Plaintiff. (See e.g. Compl., J 51, 56-61.)

It included several

specific allegations regarding the financial performance of Trois
andthe failure of
Hardy and Packer to adequately accountfor its various revenue
streams. (Compl.,
1 43- 50.) The original complaint also contained specific allega
tions regarding the
compensation of Hardy and Packer and their diversion of
revenues owed to
Rainforest for projects within its “core competency.” (Compl.,
J] 55, 63.)
Comparingthese two pleadings, the Court finds Hardy and Packe
r had “fair
notice”of the “same general factualsituation” on which the amend
edclaim rests and
that it did not “arise out of a wholly different set of facts.” Jense
n.

Accordingly,

the Court finds the amendedclaim relates back to the original filing
and is not timebarred.
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5.1.2 The Claim for Breach ofthe Reconciliation Agreementd
oes not Bar
Plaintiff's Claims for Corporate Waste and Breach of
Fiduciary
Duty.

Defendants argue that, in light of this new claim, “the Court
must dismiss

Bronner’s remaining corporate waste and fiduciary duty claims becau
se the alleged
breach of Reconciliation Agreement cannot give rise to assert
ed torts.”

(Defs.

Memo. in Supp. of Summ.J., p. 9.)
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-1 provides, “[a] tort is the unlawful violation of
a private
legal right other than a mere breachof contract...” Defendants
generally argue the
Reconciliation Agreement governed Rainforest’s compensation
and management,
andPlaintiffhas failed to allege a breach of duty independentof that
agreement such
that Plaintiff may not properly assert a tort claim. See generally
Commercial Bank
& Trust Co. v. Buford, 145 Ga. App. 213, 214 (1978) (“ifthereis noliab
ility except
that arising out of a breach ofthe express terms of a contract, the
action must be in
contract, and an action in tort cannot be maintained.” )
Defendants’ argument fails to recognize the breach of contra
ct claim is
Bronner’s direct claim concerning the breach of duties owed to
him independently
while the torts Bronneralleges are derivative and concern the breac
h of duties owed
to Rainforestandall its shareholders. This difference is addressedin
detail at § 5.1.7,

bo

below.

Moreover, Defendants made a similar argument before the
before the
appellate court, and it wasrejected.

Defendants contend that the trial court erroneously allowed
contract and tort actions based on the same conduct to
survive
summary judgment...
Plaintiff here alleged actions that went beyond Defendants
’
failure to perform under the contract, alleging that they breac
hed
their fiduciary duties to the company and engaged in deception
and
self-dealing. ‘Whereprivate duties arise from relations created
by the
contract, express or implied, one may pursue a tort action for dama
ges
flowing from the exercise or failure to exercise that duty. [Cit.]
Accordingly, Plaintiff was entitled to pursue tort claims based
on
Defendants’ purported breach of their duties beyond those expre
ssly
required by contract...
Rainforest Prod., pp. 18-19 (emphasis added).
The clear conclusions of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court, and
the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments to the contrary. See O.C.G
.A. § 9-1160(h)(“any ruling by . . . the Court of Appeals in a case shall be
binding in all
subsequent proceedingsin that case in the lower court.”’)
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
Plaintiff’s
tort claimsis denied.
5.1.3 Bronner’s Breach of Reconciliation Agreement Claim
is Not
Duplicative of his Tort Claims.

Defendants contend, “Bronner’s breach of Reconciliation Agree
ment claim
premised upon the alleged compensation structure andfinancial report
provisionsis

duplicative of the fiduciary duty and corporate waste claims
and thus, subject to
7

summary judgment.” (Defs. Memo. in Supp. of Summ. J.,p. 19.)
As outlined above,
the Court of Appeals expressly determined Bronner’s tort claim
s rested on disputed
allegations that Hardy and Packer breached fiduciary dutie
s by engaging in
deception and self-dealing that were independentof duties under
the Reconciliation
Agreement. Rainforest Prod., pp. 18-19. Moreover, Bronner’s
claim for breach of
the Reconciliation Agreementis brought on his own behal
f whereas he brings
derivative tort claims on behalf of Rainforest’s shareholders.
See § 5.1.7, infra.
Accordingly, the Court rejects the argumentthat this amended
contract claim
is duplicative of the prior pendingtort claims.
5.1.4 Questions of Fact Remain as to Whetherthe Reconcilia
tion Agreement
was Breached.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Recon
ciliation
Agreement was breached.

(Defs. Memo. in Supp. of Summ. J., pp. 20-26.)

However, Defendants havefailed to offer undisputed evidence
in support of this
position.
With regard to the Trois Financial Report, Bronner was to be
provided a
report, “setting forth in reasonable detail the financial results of
the feature film
Trois, which report shall be prepared consistent with prevailing financ
ial accounting
practices in the feature film industry.” (Reconciliation Agreement,
§ 1.6.)
Defendants assert, “Rainforest Production provided Bronner
with the

Financial Report demonstrating that Trois was not profitable
” which report was
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prepared by the Rainforest accountant. (Defs. Memo. in Supp.
of Summ.J., p. 20.)
Both Hardy and Packeraver that they,
provided Bronnerwith the Trois Accounting prepared by[th
e company
accountant] based uponall the financial information relat
ed to T}rois.
Bronner was also provided with all requested financial
documents
related to Trois and the Reconciliation Agreement. After recei
ving the
Trois Accounting and the additional financial documents,
Bronner
never expressed dissatisfaction with the Trois accounting
, requested
additional information, or otherwise expressed that
the Trois
accountingfailed to comply with the Reconciliation Agreemen
t.
(Hardy Aff., ] 38; Packer Aff, { 37; see also Deposition
of Mariellen Ballier
(“Ballier Dep.”), pp. 55-62.) The company accountanttestified
he met with Bronner
on different occasions to review the information about
Trois revenues and he
produced to Bronnerall the Trois financial informatio
n, and he never received a

request for additional information ora protestthat the informatio
n he provided was
insufficient. (Barren Watson Deposition (“Watson Dep.”), pp.
200-203, 209-211.)
However, the Trois Financial Report identified by Defendants
is a cursory,
one-page document. (Defs. SMF, filed Feb. 21, 2018,
¥ 100; Ex. L; Watson Dep.,

pp. 179-184.) Bronnertestified the statement he received
was incomplete as it was
missing information about revenues obtained from telev
ision rights.

(Bronner

Depo., pp. 140-141.) Packer acknowledged the Trois Finan
cial Report provided
Bronner was incomplete andlacked detail. (Packer Depo.
, May 5, 2018, pp. 172174.) Hetestified one would have to look outside the four
corners of the document,
“to get specificity.” (Id., p. 176.)

Considering the evidence in the light most
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favorableto Plaintiff, the Court finds a question of fact exists as
to whether Bronner
received the reasonably detailed Trois Financial Repor
t required by the
Reconciliation Agreement.
As concerns the Year-End Bonus Pool, the Court of Appeals has
adoptedthis
Court’s prior finding that material questions of fact exist as
to the circumstances
whereby Defendants

abandoned Reconciliation Agreement’s

structure. Rainforest Prod., p. 27.

compensation

Anyfailure to comply with the compensation

structure would directly bear on the amount of monies flowing
into the Year-End
Bonus Pool, and, therefore, there is a disputed question as to wheth
er § 2.5 of the
Reconciliation Agreement was breached.
5.1.5

The Record Reflects Sufficient Evidence of Damages to
Merit
Consideration by a Factfinder

Defendants argue Bronnerhas failed to establish his damages with
requisite
certainty. (Defs. Memo. in Supp. of Summ. J., pp. 26-29.) “To
avoid summary
judgment, a party is not required to present evidence of a specific
dollar amount of
damages. Rather, he must only present evidence sufficient to
serve as the basis for
a factfinder to calculate the amount of damages dueshould liability
be established.”
Beale v. O’Shea, 319 Ga. App. 1, 6 (2012) (citations and punctuatio
n omitted.)
Defendants made a similar argument about the uncertainty
of Plaintiffs

damages on the breach of fiduciary duty claims which wasre
jected on appeal.

Rainforest Prod., p.28. Applying Beale, the Court of Appeals found
record evidence
would permita jury to calculate Plaintiff's damages.
For example, at Hardy’s deposition, he stated that the mone
y he made
from the loan-out arrangements wentto R. Hardy, LLC,
his individual

corporation. He then reviewed tax returns from R. Hardy, LLC
which
represented that his corporation listed gross sales of $301,
255 for the
2012 tax year, which could be compared by a jury to the
$175,000
salary he gave up,to determineif Rainforest would have recei
ved more
or less money had Hardy remained on his salary arrangemen
t rather
than shifting to the loan-out arrangement.
Id., p. 29.

This Court finds the appellate court’s reasoning equally
applicable to this
claim and finds sufficient record evidence of damages
from the breach of the
Reconciliation Agreementexists for the Jury to decide damages.
5.1.6

Defendants Have Failed to Establish Bronner’s
Conduct
Precludes_ Recovery on his Claim for Breach
of the
Reconciliation Agreement

Withoutciting any authority, Defendants claim Bronner’s condu
ct leaves him
without the right to complain of any purported breach. (Defs
. Memo. in Supp. of
Mot. for Summ. J., p. 29.) Generally referring to their own
Statement of Material
Facts, Defendants claim Bronner exploited Rainforest for his
own benefit.

(Def.

SMF, ] 64-83, 116-121, 126-130). In doing so, they ignor
e the fact that their
statements have beenlargely disputed. (PI. Resp. to Defs. SMF,
4] 64-83, 116-121;

126-130.)
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Defendants also claim that Bronner’s breach ofthe
non-disparagementclause
of the Reconciliation Agreement precludes him
from seeking recovery for the
contract’s breach.

(Defs. Memo. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., p.
29.)

As

Defendants have acknowledged, after the last
round of motions for summary

judgment and the appellate court’s review, the
question of Bronner’s alleged
violation of the non-disparagement clause remains a jury
question. (Defs. Resp. to
Mot. for Leave to Amend,p. 3-4; Cons. PTO, { 8.)
Defendants have failed to establish with citation
to applicable law or
undisputed evidence that Bronner’s conduct prec
ludes his recovery under the
Reconciliation Agreement.
5.1.7 Bronner has Standing to bring Certain
Direct Action Claims for
Breachof the Reconciliation Agreement.
Defendants argue, like the fraud claim, Bronner
lacks standing to assert a

direct claim for breach of the Reconciliation Agreemen
t. (Defs. Memo. in Supp. of
Summ. J., pp. 11-16.) Notably, Bronner’s response
to Defendants’ motion offers no
opposition to this particular argument.
Crittenton _v. Southland Owners Ass'n, Inc., 312
Ga. App. 521 (201 1)
explains the distinctions between these two types ofac
tions.
[a] derivative suit is brought on behalf of a corporation
for harm
done to it, and any damages recovered are paid
to the
corporation. And althoughplaintiffs maybring direc
t actions for
injuries doneto them in their individual capacities
by corporate

fiduciaries, our Supreme Court hasheldthat to
have standing to
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sue individually, rather than derivatively on behalf of the

corporation, the plaintiff must allege more than an injury
resulting from a wrongto the corporation. In fact, to set out an
individual action, the plaintiff must allege either an injury
which is separate and distinct from that suffered by other

members, or a wrong involving a contractual right ofamember
which
exists independently of any right of the

corporation. Thus, for a plaintiff to have standing to bring an
individual action, he mustbe injured directly or independently of
the corporation.
Id. at 524 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis added).; see
also Callicott

v. Scott, 357 Ga. App. 780, 786 (2020). Accordingly, the Court mustclosely
review
the allegations of breach and determine whether Bronner’s claimed injurie
s are
distinct from those injuries suffered by other Rainforest shareholders or
whether
Bronner seeks to enforce contractual rights specific to himself.

The Second

Amended Complaint claims the Reconciliation Agreement was breached in
three
general ways. (Second Am. Compl., { 96.)
Onealleged breach concernsfinancial reporting obligations owed to Bronn
er
and the Trois Investors. (Second Am. Compl., 196.) The Reconciliation Agree
ment
recognizes, “Bronnerplayed a significant role in securing the investment bycert
ain
persons” defined as Trois Investors, “in connection with the production” of
Trois.
(Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals J 4.) In addition to his own personal invest
ment
in this particular film, Bronnertestified he convinced friends to invest
$200,000 in

Trois, and he felt personally responsible to account for their investment.
(Bronner

Dep., pp. 50-51; 57, 139-140.) Considering the reco
rd in a light most favorable to
Bronner, the Trois Investors were outside investor
s and not necessarily Rainforest
shareholders. Bronnertestified that after the
success of Trois, Rainforest was no

longerrequired to self-financeits own films. (Id.,
p. 52.)
Section § 1.6 of the Reconciliation Agreementprovide
s,
[w]ithin 120 days following the end of calendar year 2010
, [Rainforest]
shall have prepared and delivered to Bronner a finan
cial report (the
“Trois_Financial_Report”) setting forth in reasonab
le detail the
financial results of the feature film “Trois”, which
report shall be
prepared consistent with prevailing financial accounting
practices in the
feature film industry. If and to the extent the Trois
Financial Report
reflects that “Trois” earned net revenues greater
than the aggregate
amountof previous distributions made to the Trois Inves
tors . . . then
Bronner and the Trois Investors shall be entit
led to receive a
distribution of such excess net revenue amount pursuantt
o the formula
set forth in the original investment agreement(s) ente
red into between
[Rainforest] and the Trois Investors. In such event, [Rain
forest] shall
cause any such requireddistributions to be made to the
Trois Investors
within 60 days following the preparation ofthe Trois
Financial Report
(emphasisin original).
Asreflected in the quotation above, these 7rois Inves
tors had their own investment

agreements with Rainforest. (Id. § 1.6) Again, consider
ing the record in the light
most favorableto Plaintiff, § 1.6 was drafted to address
a concern unique to Bronner
and the Trois Investors and the alleged breach caus
ed an injury to Bronnerthat is
not shared generally by other Rainforest shareholde
rs. Accordingly, the breach
claim may be pursued directly. Crittenton.
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Bronneralso alleges a breach of
§ 2.5 of the Reconciliation Agr
eement
concerning the Year-End BonusPoo
l. (Second Am. Compl., J 96.)
Only Hardy,
Packer and Bronnerwereto benefi
t from this particular provision,not
the Rainforest
shareholders generally. According
ly, the Court finds a direct claim
for this breach
is permissible. Id.
Finally, Bronner alleges breach
es regarding the compensation
structure
otherwise establishedin establish
ed by §§ 2.2-2.4 of the Reconciliati
on Agreement.
(Second Am. Compl., § 96.) Pla
intiff claims Hardy and Packer
unilaterally
abandoned the structure to pursue
independent projects and diverted
Rainforest
opportunities for their own benefit.
(Second Am. Compl., § 64.) While
this alleged
breach wouldbe relevantto the cal
culation of the Year-End Bonus Poo
l discussed
above, the claim itself -- for lost
Rainforest revenues-- wouldinu
re to the benefit of
all Rainforest shareholders, not Jus
t Bronner. See generally Levy v.
Reiner, 290 Ga.

App. 471, 473 (2008) (as a generalru
le, claims relating to the misapprop
riation of
corporate assets concern injuries to
all the company’s shareholders and
belongto the
corporation). Therefore, this par
ticular alleged breach of the Rec
onciliation

Agreement should be pursued derivativ

ely.22

oo

2 The Court of Appeals employed
this same reasoning in affirming this
Court’s grant of summary judgment
Plaintiff's direct claim offraud, Rain
on
forest Prod., pp. 33-35.
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5.1.8 Hardy and Packer are No
t Obligated under §§ 1.6 and
2.5 ofthe
Reconciliation Agreement.

Defendants claim neither Hardy
nor Packer are personally liable
for the
alleged breach of Reconciliation
Agreement § 1.6 regarding provis
ion of the Trois
accounting or § 2.5 regarding the
calculation of the Year-End Bonu
s Pool as the
Reconciliation Agreement obliga
ted Rainforest to fulfil] each of the
se obligations.
(Defs. Memo.in Supp. of Summ.J.
, pp. 17-18.)
Defendants cite Souza v. Berberian
, 342 Ga. App. 165 (2017) where
plaintiff

sued the individual who executed
the contract on behalf of the corpor
ate signatory.
Souza states, “i]t is axiomatic tha
t a person who is not a party to a
contract is not
boundbyits terms” and “Ta]s a gen
eral tule, an action on a contract.
.. Shall be
brought . . . against the party who
madeit.” Id. at 169-170. Howeve
r,that is not

the situation before this Court.23

Here, Hardy signed the agreement
on behalf of

—
3
In addition to Souza, Defendants
cite other cases where non-parties
are pursuing or defending breach
contract claims. (Defs. Memo, in
of
Supp. of Summ. J., pp. 17-18; Defs
. Reply, p. 10.) In Levy v. Reiner,
471, 473 (2008), a claim regardin
290 Ga, App.
g breach of a consulting agreemen
t was dismissed against the corporat
because, although the contract obli
e defendant
gated the corporation to perform
certain duties, the contract was
corporate official in his personal
signed by a
capacity. Accordingly, the cont
ract was not binding on the comp
corporation is a separate entity, disti
any. “[E]ach
nct and apart from its stockholders
and a person who is not a party to
(ie., is not namedin the contract
a contract
andhasnotexecutedit), is not boun
d byits terms (punctuation and citat
Id. Here, unlike Levy, Hardy and
ion omitted).”
Packer are parties to the Reconcil
iation Agreement which they signe
individual capacities,
din their
In Accurate Printers, Inc. v. Stark,
295 Ga. App. 172, 175 (2008), the
Court of Appeals affirmed the entr
a directed verdict on a breach of cont
y of
ract claim because the corporate
plaintiff was not a party to the contr
principal had signedin his individu
actthatits
al capacity and thus the corporation
lacked standing to sue. By contrast,
the parties to this breach of contract clai
here, all
m -- Bronner, Hardy and Packer-- exec
uted the Reconciliation Agreementin
their individual capacities.
Defendants also cite Hall v. Ross
, 273 Ga. App. 811 (2005) as “aff
irming summary judgment in favo
defendant who was sued despite not
r of
being a party to the subject contract
.” (Def. Memo.in Supp. of Summ.
However, Hall merely notes that
J., p. 18.)
plaintiff had sued a corporation “whi
ch apparently wasnota party to
Thus,the trial court granted sum
the contract.
mary judgment in favor of the defe
ndan
t, and [plaintiff] does not challeng
judgment.” Id. at n. 1.
e that
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Rainforest in his capacity as Presid
ent. However, Hardy also signed
the agreement
in his individual capacity as did Pac
ker. Additionally, Hardy and Pac
ker expressly
acknowledged in the body of the
agreementthat they were “primaril
y responsible
for and actively involved in the
management and oversight of the
day-to-day
operations andaffairs of [Rainfore
st] ...” (Reconciliation Agreement
, Recitals, 14.)
Envision Printing, LLC v. Evans, 336
Ga. App. 635 (2016) involved a dis
pute
regarding the capacity in which a
CEO signed a promissory note on
behalf ofhis
company. In determining whether he
was personallyliable for the debt, the
appellate
court “examine[d] the language oft
he contract to determine in what
capacity the
representative [was] bound.” Id. at
637. Specifically, it applied the gen
eral rules of
contract construction, beginning wit
h thefirst step whereby,“the trial
court must
decide whetherthe language is cle
ar and unambiguous. Ifit is, no con
struction is
required,andthe court simply enforc
esthe contract accordingto its clear
terms.” Id.
at 638.
Here, § 1.6 of the Reconciliation Act
expressly requires Rainforest to pro

vide

the Trois Financial Report and make
any necessary distribution to Bronne
r andthe
Trois Investors. Similarly, § 2.5
expressly requires Rainforest to cal
culate and
establish the Year End Bonus Poo
l, issue written notifications ofit
s amount, and

make any required payments. As not
ed in Avery v. Grubb, 336 Ga. App.
452, 460
(2016), “[a]s an artificial person, a
corporation can act, and does act, alo
ne through
32

agents. It deals with other Corpor
ations and with natural personsb
yits agents;it can
deal with the world in no other
way.” Thus, while Hardy and
Packer as Founders
may havebeen responsible for
actually performingthese tasks
in their Rainforest
oversightroles, accordingto the
clear termsofthe Reconciliati
on Agreement, these
legal obligations belong solely
to Rainforest. See also White
v. Shamrock Bldg.
Systems, Inc., 294 Ga. App.
340, 348 (2008)(“The corporate
identity is entirely
separate from theidentity ofits
officers and stockholders.”)
Moreover, the Court’s conclu
sion is consistent with the fr
amework of the

Reconciliation Agreement when
considered as a whole.

See O.C.G.A. § 13-2-

2(4)(“the whole contract should
be looked to in arriving at the con
struction of any
part.”)
The contract specifically identi
fies those obligations that bel
ong to
Rainforest and those that belong
to Hardy and Packer. For exampl
e, provisions of
the Reconciliation Agreem
ent regarding releases,
non-disparagement,
indemnification, warranties and
notices treat Rainforest separatel
y from the other

signatories Hardy and Packer
. (Id., §§ 1.4, 1.5, 3.1, 3.2,
3.5, 4.1, 4.3, 5.1.)

Accordingly, the contractitself doe
s not contemplate that Hardy and
Packer would
individually be responsible for the
obligations undertaken by Rainfo
rest,
In light of the foregoing, the Cou

rt finds Hardy and Packerare not

individually

liable to Plaintiff for breachesof
§§ 1.6 and 2.5 of the Reconciliati
on Agreement.
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5.2

Plaintiff’s Motion Jor Partial Summar

y Judgment — Breach ofContract

In light of the Court’s determinatio
n in Section 5.1.8 above that no por
tion of
Plaintiff's amended claim for breach
of the Reconciliation Agreementis
viable, the
Plaintiff's cross Motion for Partia
l Summary Judgment — Breach of
Contract is

denied.”

6. CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDEREDthat Defend
ants’ Motion for Summary Judgme
ntis

GRANTED. Itis further ORDERE
D that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary
Judgment — Breach of Contractis DE
NIED.

SO ORDEREDthis

yr

day of April, 2021.
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Alternatively, even if the Court were
to consider the merits of Plaintiff'
s motion, summary judgment woul
notbe appropriate.
d
First, contrary to Plaintiff's argument
, a question of fact exists as to whet
her § 1.6 of the Reconciliation
Agreementwasbreached. (PI. Mot.
for Part. Summ. J.» Pp. 8-9.) While
the formal Trois Financial Report
been cursory, Defendants supplied
may have
Bronner with significant amounts
ofadditional financial information
and received no complaint from Bron
abou
t Trois
nerin response. (Hardy Aff., | 38;
Packer Aff., | 37; Ballier Dep., pp.
Watson Dep., pp. 202-205, 209-211.
55-62;
) Viewing the evidencein the light
most favorable to the Defendants, a
question of fact exists as to whet
disputed
her Rainforest substantially complied
with § 1.6’s reporting requirement.
generally, TRST Atlanta, Inc. v. 1815
See
Exch., Inc., 220 Ga. App. 184, 187
(1996) (while commonlaw required
compliance in the performance of
strict
a contract, “substantial compliance
with the terms of the contract is
sufficient.”)
[now]

Second,contrary to Plaintiff's argument
that Defendants did not adhere to the
Reconciliation Agreement’s
revenue-sharing provisions,factual disp
utes would preclude the entry of summar
y judgment. (PI. Mot. for Part.
Agreement, was abandoned. Rainfore
st Prod., p. 24.
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